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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MANUEL JACUINDE,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48243-2020
Cassia County Case No. CR16-20-65

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Manuel Jacuinde failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
when it imposed a sentence of five years with two years determinate upon his conviction for grand
theft?
ARGUMENT
Jacuinde Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion

A.

Introduction
The state charged Jacuinde with grand theft in violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-

2407(1)(b), and 18-2408(2) for stealing a maroon Chevy Cruise on or about January 3, 2020. (R.,
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pp. 23-24.) Jacuinde pled guilty. (R., pp. 44-45.) The court imposed a five-year sentence, with
two years determinate, to run concurrently with a sentence then-recently imposed in Minidoka
County for another criminal offense. 1 (R., p. 59.) The district court also retained jurisdiction.
(Id.)
Jacuinde timely appealed. (See R., pp. 59-61, 64-65.)
B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or

her own conduct induces the commission of the error.” State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 915, 265
P.3d 519, 528 (Ct. App. 2011). “Idaho courts have long held that one may not successfully
complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in.” State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819,
864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In other words, invited
errors are not reversible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The invited error doctrine applies
to sentencing decisions. State v. Griffith, 110 Idaho 613, 614, 716 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Ct. App.
1986).
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the
defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
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The Minidoka County case against Jacuinde, No. CR34-20-66, is hereinafter referred to as the
“Minidoka County Case.” Jacuinde has another appeal pending for the Minidoka County Case,
Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 48246-2020.
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is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating whether a lower court abused
its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which asks “whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho
261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421
P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

The Doctrine Of Invited Error Precludes Reversal
Where a defendant receives the sentence he had requested from the trial court, the invited

error doctrine requires the appellate court to affirm his sentence, unless the sentence violates the
court’s statutory authority or defense counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing. See
Griffith, 110 Idaho at 614, 716 P.2d at 1386. In Griffith, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
concurrent, indeterminate ten-year sentences for two counts of grand theft, which the defendant
had requested from the trial court and then appealed, contending the sentences were excessive. Id.
The court reasoned that the invited error doctrine applied. Id. The sentence was under the statutory
maximum for grand theft. Id. (citing I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a) (maximum sentence for grand theft is
fourteen years’ imprisonment per offense)). And there was nothing in the record indicating that
defense counsel “acted against his client’s interests or otherwise provided ineffective assistance.”
Id.; --see --also ----Pentico, 151 Idaho at 915, 265 P.3d at 528 (holding invited error doctrine precluded
-reversal when defendant had prevented evidence at issue from being introduced); Atkinson, 124
Idaho at 819-21, 864 P.2d at 657-59 (applying invited error doctrine to affirm denial of motion for
mistrial when challenged testimony was responsive to defense counsel’s questioning at trial).
3

The invited error doctrine applies to this case, which poses identical circumstances to that
in Griffith. As Jacuinde admits on appeal, he received the sentence he had requested. (Appellant’s
brief, p. 1 (“Mindful that the court imposed the sentence Mr. Jacuinde requested, he asserts that
the court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.”).) At the sentencing hearing,
he requested a five-year sentence, with two years determinate, to run concurrently with the
sentence imposed in the Minidoka County Case. (07/13/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 4-15. 2) This was precisely
the sentence the district court imposed. (See 07/13/20 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 6-20; R., p. 59.) The sentence
was well under the statutory maximum of fourteen years’ imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.
(Compare R., p. 59, with I.C. § 18-2408(2).) And there is nothing in the record to indicate that
Jacuinde’s counsel acted against his interest or otherwise rendered ineffective assistance. On the
contrary, Jacuinde’s counsel secured him a lenient sentence. (Id.) This Court should affirm
Jacuinde’s sentence on the basis of invited error.
D.

In Any Event, Jacuinde Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
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The state and Jacuinde had originally contemplated probation, but probation became a moot
consideration after Minidoka County court retained jurisdiction. The plea agreement included the
recommendation of a five-year sentence, with two years determinate, to run concurrent with the
sentence imposed in “any other case.” (R., pp. 31-32.) The plea agreement also recommended
that the sentence in the instant case be suspended for a period of probation. (See id.; 07/13/20 Tr.,
p. 6, Ls. 16-19; p. 8, Ls. 6-9.) Before the sentencing hearing in the instant case, the Minidoka
County court retained jurisdiction. (07/13/20 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 16-20.) Accordingly, an immediate
term of probation in the instant case was no longer possible because Jacuinde would be engaged
in the rider program for the next year. (See 07/13/20 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 16-20; p. 8, Ls. 6-9, 19-23.)
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is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
There “is no requirement that sentencing courts articulate the reasons for imposition of a
particular sentence.” State v. Magsamen, 167 Idaho 655, ___, 474 P.3d 1252, 1256 (Ct. App.
2020) (citing State v. Martinsen, 128 Idaho 472, 475, 915 P.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1996)). “Where
the sentencing court has set forth no reasons for imposition of a sentence, the appellate court draws
its own impressions from the record and will affirm what it infers to be a reasonable exercise of
sentencing discretion.” Id. at ___, 474 P.3d at 1256-57.
Even assuming the invited error doctrine somehow does not bar Jacuinde’s challenge to
his sentence, the sentence imposed is reasonable. The district court properly considered the goals
of sentencing, the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 19-2521, the arguments of counsel, and
Jacuinde’s statement. (07/13/20 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 9-20.) Although the maximum penalty for grand
theft is fourteen years’ imprisonment, a fine up to $5,000, or both (07/13/20 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 4-6), the
court imposed the much more lenient sentence Jacuinde had requested (07/13/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 4-
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15; R., p. 59). And Jacuinde was not a first-time offender, having a prior felony and two
misdemeanors. (PSI, p. 2 (felony), pp. 4-5 (misdemeanors). 3)
Jacuinde argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to
appropriately consider (1) Jacuinde’s drug addiction and willingness to seek treatment, and (2) his
remorse. (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) Jacuinde is incorrect. As a threshold matter, the trial court is
not obligated to impose a lighter sentence based on potential mitigating factors. See State v.
Coffin, 146 Idaho 166, 171-72, 191 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Ct. App. 2008) (affirming sentence when
trial court had stated that it had considered mitigating circumstances); State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658,
663-64, 239 P.3d 456, 461-62 (Ct. App. 2010) (affirming sentence when the trial court had
considered mitigating circumstances and decided they did not warrant a lesser sentence).
Contrary to Jacuinde’s contention, the trial court appropriately considered the potential
mitigating factors. First, Jacuinde has not met his burden to show that the trial court erred by
insufficiently considering his addiction and amenability to treatment. See State v. Quintana, 155
Idaho 124, 134, 306 P.3d 209, 219 (Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial
court not discussing each mitigating factor meant that the court had insufficiently considered such
factors). The trial court heard Jacuinde’s statement at the sentencing hearing, in which he said, “I
have an addiction, I am an addict, and I’m looking forward to the person I am a year from now,
once I get this retained jurisdiction out of the way.” (07/13/20 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 19-23.)
Second, the district court adequately considered any remorse that Jacuinde expressed.
Jacuinde did not say anything indicating regret at the sentencing hearing. (See 07/13/20 Tr., p. 8,
Ls. 19-23.) And in the PSI, Jacuinde stated that he felt “[r]emorseful for the pain I may have
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The district court in the instant case reviewed and proceeded on the PSI from the Minidoka
County Case. (07/13/20 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 14-16.)
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caused anyone affected by my drug use/crime” in response to questioning about the crime at issue
in the Minidoka County Case, possession of methamphetamine. (07/13/20 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 14-16;
PSI, pp. 4, 6.) This non-existent record of remorse does not support Jacuinde’s argument. Further,
even if Jacuinde had expressed remorse, the court need not discuss every potential mitigating factor
at sentencing. Quintana, 155 Idaho at 134, 306 P.3d at 219.
And this case is distinguishable from Nice and Alberts, the cases on which Jacuinde relies.
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (citing State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982) and State v.
Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991).) In those cases, there was no contention
that the court had imposed the sentence requested by the defendant. See Nice, 103 Idaho at 9091, 645 P.2d at 324-25; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 204-11, 824 P.2d at 135-42. And the court in Nice
reasoned that the defendant was a first-time felony offender supporting his children at the time of
the offense, 103 Idaho at 90-91, 645 P.2d at 324-25, unlike this case, where Jacuinde has a prior
record and has three children but was unemployed for the one and a half years immediately
preceding his offense (PSI, pp. 4-6, 9-10).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 19th day of May, 2021.

/s/ Jennifer Jensen
JENNIFER JENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

JJ/dd

/s/ Jennifer Jensen
JENNIFER JENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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